INTRODUCTION
Possibility semantics [19] (based on [20] ) is a generalization of standard Kripke semantics that makes use of a concept of possibility frames. 1 Like Kripke frames, possibility frames have a set of states and binary accessibility relations for modalities. In addition, possibility frames have a refinement relation, which is a partial order between states. Some states in a possibility model may only partially determine the atomic propositions, in contrast to worlds in Kripke models, which completely determine each atomic proposition. Consequently, possibility frames have a close connection with intuitionistic modal frames, but the former yield classical modal logic. As is the case for intuitionistic modal semantics, a key issue for possibility semantics is the interaction between the refinement and accessibility relations. In this setting, modal axioms express properties not only of the accessibility relation but also of the interaction between accessibility and refinement.
While standard Kripke frames are semantically equivalent to complete, atomic and completely additive Boolean algebras with operators (BAOs), possibility frames are semantically equivalent to complete and completely additive, but not necessarily atomic, BAOs. As shown in [19, Theorem 5 .27], for any complete and completely additive BAO, there exists a possibility frame that validates the same modal formulae as the BAO does, and vice versa, just as there exists such a modally equivalent Kripke frame for any complete, atomic and completely additive BAO. It follows from this and other results [21] that more normal modal logics are sound and complete with respect to some class of possibility frames than with respect to some class of Kripke frames. For other recent results on possibility semantics and mention related work, see [4, 5, 17, 16] .
In the present paper, we show how aspects of correspondence theory, as studied for standard Kripke semantics [1] , can be extended to the more general setting of possibility semantics. In Section 2, we introduce possibility semantics briefly, referring to [19] for a more detailed account of the semantics. We define key concepts such as possibility frames, possibility models and the standard translation. In Section 3, we study syntactic sufficient conditions for local correspondence. In particular, we prove the analogue of Sahlqvist's Theorem for possibility semantics, namely, that every Sahlqvist Date: June 28, 2017. I wish to give special thanks to Wesley Holliday for his extensive and helpful comments and discussion. I also wish to thank James Walsh, Matthew Harrison-Trainor and an anonymous referee for useful comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful for useful comments on the paper from the participants of the 50th MLG meeting in Kyôto, Japan, in January 2016. While completing this work, I benefited from a talk by Alessandra Palmigiano at the Berkeley-Stanford Circle in Logic and Philosophy in May 2016, as well as her helpful further correspondence by email. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Takenaka Scholarship Foundation. 1 What we call "possibility frames" in the present paper are essentially the "full possibility frames" of [19] .
formula locally corresponds to a first-order formula with respect to possibility frames. This extends a result [19, Proposition 6.23] which states that Lemmon-Scott formulae ◊ā b p → c ◊d p have first-order correspondents over possibility frames. In Section 4, we study more model-theoretic aspects of correspondence theory. We prove a counterpart of van Benthem's characterization [2] of first-order definable modal formulae in terms of preservation by ultrapowers. Finally, in Section 5 we state an open problem for future research and related work.
POSSIBILITY SEMANTICS
2.1. Introduction to the semantics. Fix an enumeration Φ = {p i | i ∈ κ} (κ = |Φ|) of propositional variables (whose indices we sometimes identify with the variables themselves) and a nonempty set I of modal operator indices. Then the modal language (Φ, I) is generated by the following grammar:
where φ ∈ (Φ, I), p ∈ Φ and a ∈ I. We assume that φ 1 ∨ φ 2 and ◊ a φ are shorthand for ¬(¬φ 1 ∧ ¬φ 2 ) and ¬ a ¬φ, respectively. We view a partially ordered set as a topological space whose open sets are the downward closed sets. This is an Alexandrov topology. We denote by X and X
• the closure and the interior of a set X ⊆ , so X = {x ∈ | ∃x x x ∈ X } and X • = {x ∈ | ∀x x x ∈ X }, where is the partial order of . We write RO( ) for the set of regular open subsets of , i.e., those subsets X ⊆ such that X • = X . For X ⊆ , the least regular open set containing X is (⇓ X )
• , where ⇓ X denotes the least downward closed set containing X . We write X ro for (⇓ X )
• . Note that (·) ro satisfies the axioms of closure operators: for any X , Y ⊆ , we have X ⊆ X ro , X ro = (X ro ) ro and X ⊆ Y ⇒ X ro ⊆ Y ro . For x, y ∈ , we also write x y to indicate that x and y are compatible, i.e., ∃z (z x ∧ z y). We write x ⊥ y to indicate that it is not the case that x y.
We give a definition of possibility frames in the following. Note that, in [19, Definition 2.21], the term "possibility frame" is used for a kind of general frame version of the structures defined in Definition 2.1.(i) below, which are essentially the "full possibility frames" of [19, Definition 2.21] . The structures in Definition 2.1.(i) are the possibility-semantic analogues of Kripke frames.
Definition 2.1.
(i) A possibility frame is a triple F = (F, , (R a ) a∈I ) where (F, ) is a partially ordered set, each R a is a binary relation on F , and the set RO(F) := RO(F, ) is closed under the map
for each a ∈ I. We refer to elements of F as states of the frame. We call and each R a the refinement relation and an accessibility relation of F, respectively. (ii) A possibility model is a pair M = (F, π) where π is a map Φ → RO(F), called a valuation on the frame F.
When considering a possibility frame F, we regard l a as a map RO(F) → RO(F).
Definition 2.2.
Let M = (F, π) be a possibility model and φ ∈ (Φ, I).
(i) For w ∈ M, define the relation M, w φ recursively as follows:
Call this the truth set of φ in M. (iii) For w ∈ F, we write F, w φ and say that v forces φ in F if and only if for every possibility model (F, π), we have (F, π), w φ. F validates φ if and only if for every v ∈ F, the formula φ is forced by v in F.
Note that since we define ∨ in terms of ∧ and ¬, we have the following:
Remark. Let (W, R) be an arbitrary Kripke frame. Let = (W, ) be the discrete partial order on W , i.e., x y ⇔ x = y for x, y ∈ W . Then F = ( , R) is a possibility frame. Let M 0 be a Kripke model that is an expansion of (W, R), and let M be the possibility model that is an expansion of F with the same valuation as . Let M 0 be a Kripke that is an expansion of (W, R), and let M be a possibility model that is an expansion of F with the same valuation as M 0 . Then we have
for any modal formula φ, where Kripke is the forcing relation of Kripke semantics.
In the present paper, we are interested in the relationship between the validity of a modal formula over a possibility frame and the first-order properties of the accessibility and refinement relations in the frame. To see how familiar correspondences from Kripke semantics must be reconsidered in the setting of possibility semantics, it helps to consider a concrete example, such as the following. Example 2.3. Consider the possibility frame F = (F, , R) of Figure 1 . It can be checked that F satisfies the axioms for a possibility frame. 3 Note that for each state w in F there exists exactly one v such that Rwv. This property of partial functionality is defined by the F axiom ◊p → p over standard Kripke frames. However, it can be seen that for the state y we have F, y ◊p → p. To see this, observe that the forcing clause for the defined operator ◊ works out to (see Figure 2 ):
Consider the valuation π also shown in Figure 1 . (It is easy to check that this is indeed a valuation on F, i.e., π(p) ro = π(p).) Then we know (F, π), y ◊p: in (1), the only possible value of v is y itself, and one can pick w to be t so that the right hand side holds. However, we also have (F, π), y p, since t ∈ π(p). 2 Note that the clauses for ¬ and → scan the partial order downward. This is in line with a convention used in weak forcing (see, e.g., [23] ), to which the present semantics is related. In contrast, in the literature on semantics for intuitionistic logic, the convention of going upward is more common. 3 The possibility frame F is constructed from a Kripke frame ({0, 1, 2}, R), where R is the symmetric closure Example 2.4. Another example is the B axiom p → ◊p. This defines the symmetry of the accessibility relation over standard Kripke frames. The accessibility relation R of F from Figure 1 is not symmetric. However, the B axiom is validated by F; indeed, as we will see later, p → ◊p is validated by F if and only if for every u, v, v ∈ F:
(See Figure 3 .) All the states in F are compatible with one another except that x, y, z are pairwise incompatible. These states are not in the range of R, so (2) holds. To see why (2) is equivalent to the validity of B, suppose that (2) holds in F and that (F, π), w p, i.e., w ∈ π(p). We show (F, π) It is often the case that conditions on a possibility frame that are equivalent to validity of modal formulae can be simplified by imposing additional conditions on the interaction of the accessibility and the refinement relation in possibility frames. For instance, if we assume
it is easily seen that (2) is equivalent to
which is much closer to the symmetry of R, the property that the B axiom defines over standard Kripe frames (see again Figure 3 ). In fact, many familiar modal axioms without ◊ define the same property over possibility frames satisfying (R-down) as over Kripke frames; for instance, the 4 axiom p → p is validated by a possibility frame (F, , R) satisfying (R-down) if and only if R is transitive. Moreover, (1) can be simplified if F satisfies (R-down):
(See Figure 2. ) We refer to [19, Section 2.3] for further discussion of (R-down) and other similar conditions. A few points should be made about these conditions. First, in Definition 2.1.(i) we stated a condition for a structure (F, , (R a ) a∈I ) to be a possibility frame in terms of RO(F, ) and l a ; we will see in Section 2.2 that this condition, like (R-down), can be stated in a first-order manner. Second, as shown in [19, Section 2.3], we can assume (R-down) and other conditions on the interaction of R and without loss of generality. That is, given a possibility frame F, we can construct a modally-equivalent possibility frame F that satisfies (R-down) and other interaction conditions (see also Example 3.13). Third, the main results of the present paper hold without imposing these conditions; unless otherwise stated, we do not assume (R-down) and other interaction conditions on possibility frames, beyond those that follow from the definition of possibility frames (again see Section 2.2).
To develop correspondence theory for possibility semantics, we will take an algebraic perspective on possibility frames. An important consequence of the definitions above is that truth sets in an arbitrary possibility model M := (F, π) are always in RO(F). As is the case for RO( ) where is an arbitrary partial order, RO(F) is a complete Boolean algebra with respect to set inclusion, where the meet is the intersection, the complement is the interior of the set-theoretic complement, and the join is the interior of the closure of the union. One can show that
, where ∧, − and ∨ on the right hand sides denote the meet, the complement and the join in RO(F), respectively. We trust that no confusion will arise in using the same symbols for the logical connectives and the algebraic operations.
Definition 2.5.
(i) A map f : RO(F) → RO(F) is completely additive if it preserves arbitrary joins, i.e., for every family
is completely additive if it is completely additive in i-th coordinate for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Completely multiplicative maps are defined similarly, but with joins replaced by meets.
(ii) We say that f is a left adjoint of g and that g is a right adjoint of
Note that completely additive maps are order-preserving, and that if f and g both have left adjoints, so does the composite f • g.
The complete Boolean algebra RO(F) becomes a BAO when equipped with the operators l a for a ∈ I, which are completely multiplicative operators (see [19, Section 2] for more on the duality theory relating possibility frames and BAOs). It is easy to see that, in general, a completely multiplicative map g over a complete lattice (L, ≤) has a left adjoint f of the form X → min{Z ∈ L | Y ≤ g(Z)}. In our setting, this implies that each l a has a left adjoint of the form
ro .
Translation to classical logic. Let the signature
where is a first-order binary relation symbol and each R a is a first-order binary relation symbol. We write 1 (τ) for the first-order τ-language and 2 (τ) for the monadic second-order counterpart.
1 (τ) will be our first-order correspondence language. We use x, y, z, ξ, η, ζ, etc. for first-order variables and P, Q, etc. for second-order monadic ones. In particular, let {P i } be a set of distinct monadic second-order variables, each P i corresponding to the propositional variable p i . Letτ be the signature τ
We regard a possibility frame F = (F, , (R a ) a∈I ) as a structure for 1 (τ), by letting dom F = F , F = and R F a = R a for each a ∈ I. Likewise, we regard a possibility model M = (F, π) as a structure (F, (π(p)) p∈Φ ) for 1 (τ), as an expansion of F with
In general, for a structure N, we use |= for the satisfaction relation for first-order languages, and for parameters a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ N and a first-order formula β(x; y 1 , . . . , y m ), we write β(N; a 1 , . . . , a m ) for the set {b ∈ N | N |= β(b; a 1 , . . . , a m )}.
We can view a possibility frame F as a structure for 2 (τ) in two different ways. In one view, which is employed in the rest of this section and Section 3, we consider a possibility frame F as a general prestructure for 2 (τ), with its one-place relational universe being RO(F). 5 In the other view, which appears in Section 4, we consider a possibility frame F as an (ordinary) structure for 2 (τ), with no limitation on values that bound second-order monadic variables can assume. In each case, we again write |= for the corresponding appropriate satisfaction relation for 2 (τ). Having defined classical languages and satisfaction relations, we can see, as in [19, Section 2.2] , that the various conditions imposed on possibility frames are actually firstorder. First, we can show that there exists a formula β
, where Q is a unary relation symbol, such that for every X ⊆ F, we have β
where is the inverse of . With this in mind, it can further be shown [19, Proposition 2.30] that a structure F for 1 (τ) is a possibility frame if and only if it satisfies (in addition to the axiom of partial orders) the following pair of sentences in 1 (τ) for each a ∈ I:
where U(·) denotes the universal closure. Understanding the details of these conditions will not be necessary for the purposes of this paper; what will be important for us in this paper is just that the class of possibility frames is first-order definable. We refer to [19, Section 2.3] and [4] for further discussion of these conditions, as well as simpler versions that can be assumed without loss of generality. We now give the analogue for possibility semantics of the standard translation of modal formulae into first-order formulae. Definition 2.6. For φ ∈ (Φ, I) and a variable x, we define ST x (φ) ∈ 2 (τ) inductively as follows:
Recall that we are viewing a possibility frame as a general prestructure as explained above. The following definition is standard [1] , and the lemmas following it can be proved in the usual way. Definition 2.7. For φ ∈ (Φ, I) and α(x) ∈ 1 (τ), we say that φ locally corresponds to α(x), or that α(x) is a local correspondent of φ, if for every possibility frame F and w ∈ F, we have
For a first-order sentenceα ∈ 1 (τ), we say that φ globally corresponds toα, or thatα is a global correspondent of φ, if for every possibility frame F we have F φ ⇔ F |=α. 5 Our treatment of second-order logic follows [12] . Lemma 2.8. Given a possibility frame F, w ∈ F and φ ∈ (Φ, I), we have
where U 2 (φ) denotes the universal quantification by the monadic second-order variables P i occurring in φ. (Recall that in this section the domain of monadic second-order quanitification is RO(F) for a possibility frame F.) Lemma 2.9. For φ ∈ (Φ, I) and α(x) ∈ 1 (τ), the following are equivalent:
(ii) For arbitrary possibility frame F and w ∈ F, we have
SAHLQVIST THEORY
In this section, we prove the possibility-semantic version of Sahlqvist's Theorem. For (Φ, I), positive and negative occurrences of propositional variables, and positive and negative formulae are defined recursively as follows. For p ∈ Φ, the occurrence of p in p ∈ (Φ, I) is positive. Suppose an occurrence of p in φ ∈ (Φ, I) is positive (respectively, negative) and ψ ∈ (Φ, I). Then the corresponding occurrences of p in φ ∧ ψ, ψ ∧ φ, ψ → φ and a φ are positive (respectively, negative); and the corresponding occurrences of p in ¬φ and φ → ψ are negative (respectively, positive). A modal formula is positive (respectively, negative) if all occurrences of all propositional variables in it are positive (respectively, negative).
We define Sahlqvist antecedents, Sahlqvist implications and Sahlqvist formulae in the standard way (see, e.g., [6] ). More concretely, they are specified by the following grammar:
(boxed atoms)
where i ∈ Φ, a ∈ I, and in the last clause the disjuncts do not have shared variables. The following is the main theorem of the present section:
Theorem 3.1. Every Sahlqvist formula locally corresponds to a first-order formula in the setting of possibility semantics. Moreover, one can effectively calculate the firstorder correspondent from a Sahlqvist formula.
The rest of the present section is devoted to developing a theory necessary to prove the theorem. The argument will be based on algebraic correspondence theory [11] , although there will be slight changes in terminology and convention.
The key observation is as follows. Call a class function a definably enumerable class if the domain of is the class of possibility frames and there exists a formula β(x; z 1 , . . . , z k ) ∈ 1 (τ) such that for every F we have
) is satisfied by F and a variable assignment sending x to w.
Lemma 3.2.
Let φ(p 0 , . . . , p n−1 ) ∈ (Φ, I) and 0 , . . . , n−1 be definably enumerable classes. 7 Assume for every possibility frame F and w ∈ F, the following are equivalent:
Then, φ locally corresponds to a first-order formula. In what follows, by F we mean a possibility frame.
Proof

Definition 3.3.
A modal formula is normative if, for each p ∈ Φ, the number of positive occurrences of p in it is at most one. 8 In the following, we assume, without loss of generality, that negative propositional variables in a normative Sahlqvist antecedent are all towards the end of the enumeration p 0 , p 1 , . . . of the propositional variables occurring in the formula.
We will later associate with a normative Sahlqvist antecedent a certain kind of map, a Sahlqvist map, between partial orders. Below, n will be the number of propositional variables in a normative antecedent, and m will be the number of those that occur positively.
m is the projection onto the first m coordinates, i.e., π m (X 0 , . . . , X n−1 ) = (X 1 , . . . , X m−1 ); (iii) each g i : RO(F) → RO(F) has a left adjoint of the form
(iv) each h i : RO(F) n → RO(F) is order-reversing. 7 By the notation like φ(p 0 , . . . , p n−1 ), we understand hereafter that all propositional variables occurring in the formula are present in the parentheses. 8 In [11] , a related but slightly different concept of 1-implications is used.
Note that for a formula φ(p 0 , . . . , p n−1 ) ∈ (Φ, I) and possibility models (F, π) and (F, π ), we have φ (F,π) = φ (F,π ) if π n = π n, where we identify propositional variables with their indices. Write φ F for the map RO(F) n → RO(F) that maps π ∈ RO(F) n to the unique value of φ (F,π) where π: Φ → RO(F) extendsπ.
Lemma 3.5. Let φ ∈ (Φ, I) be a positive (respectively, negative) formula. Then φ F is order-preserving (respectively, order-reversing).
Proof. By simultaneous induction.
For a sequence of modal indicesā ∈ I <ω and a modal formula φ, we define the expression ā φ recursively as 〈〉 φ = φ and āb φ = ā b φ. Let r : I <ω → I <ω be the string reversal; i.e., r(〈〉) = 〈〉 and r(bā) = r(ā)b. 
For X ∈ RO(F), we write
Note that the lemma above is a consequence of (·) ro being a closure operator and RO(F) being the set of fixed points of (·) ro . Forā ∈ I <ω , write Vā 1 (F) for the family of regular open sets that are either empty or of the form R 
Lemma 3.8. For each X ∈ RO(F) and for eachā,
Therefore, Vā 1 is a definably enumerable class as witnessed by the first-order formula βā 1 (x; z)
is a first-order formula that defines X ro in the expansion of F that interprets Q as X .) 9 We use the λ-notation and the notation for syntactic substitution as in [6] .
Proof. For S ⊆ F × F , let us define the map l S by, for X ⊆ F, l S (X ) = {x ∈ F | ∀ y (S x y ⇒ y ∈ X )}. V 0 is also a definably enumerable class trivially. n → RO(F) be order-preserving. Then for w ∈ F, the following are equivalent:
Proof. For simplicity, assume n = 2, m = 1, and l = 2; it is straightforward to adapt the proof below for the general case. and h: RO(F) 2 → RO(F) is order-reversing. Take arbitrary P 0 , P 1 ∈ RO(F) and assume w ∈ f (P 0 , P 1 ). We will show w ∈ G(P 0 , P 1 ).
By the adjunction, we can show that if
Since h is order-reversing and f 0 is order-preserving, w ∈ f 0 (g( ), h( , P 1 )) = f ( , P 1 ). By ∈ Vā 0 1 and (10), we have w ∈ G(P 0 , P 1 ). Assume g(P 0 ) = . Since h is order-reversing, f 0 is completely additive, and g(P 0 ) = X ≤ 1 g(P 0 ) X (by Lemma 3.7), we have
where the last equality follows because g's left adjoint is Y → R
Note that Q x ∈ Vā 0 1 (F) and that g(Q x ) ⊇ {x} ro (the latter is by the general fact that the composite of a right adjoint after its left adjoint is inflating). Then
The inclusion (9) is by the order-reversing property of h and the order-preserving property of f 0 ; (10) is by (8) ; and (11) is because G is order-preserving. 
Proof. Note that, for w ∈ F, we have (F, P 0 , . . . , P n−1 ) |= ST w (φ → ψ) if and only if ∀w w (w ∈ φ F (P 0 , . . . , P n−1 ) ⇒ w ∈ ψ F (P 0 , . . . , P n−1 )).
By Lemma 3.6, φ F is a Sahlqvist map of type (n, m, l;ā 0 , . . . ,ā m−1 ) for some l ∈ ω. By Lemma 3.5, ψ F is order-preserving. By applying Lemma 3.9 to each w w, we obtain the equivalence between (13) and (14) .
Corollary 3.11. For any Sahlqvist implication χ with a normative antecedent, there exists a first-order formula α(x) such that χ corresponds to α(x).
Proof. By Corollary 3.10 and Lemma 3.2.
We will now see that the general case reduces to that of normative formulae. For V, V ⊆ RO(F), write V + V for the family of regular open sets of the form P ∨ P , where P ∈ V and P ∈ V . Note that if both and are definably enumerable classes, so is the class + which is defined by ( + )(F) = (F) + (F). Then the following are also equivalent for each w ∈ F:
, 17) . (16) ⇒ (15) is by assumption. (15) ⇒ (17) is by instantiating (15) with P 1 . . . , P n−1 := P 0 , by 0≤i<m p i F (P 0 , . . . , P n−1 ) = 0≤i<m P i , and by the definition of σ. We show (18) ⇒ (16). For simplicity, assume n = 3 and m = 2 (the proof can be adapted for other cases straightforwardly). Take arbitrary P 0 ∈ V 0 and P 1 ∈ V 1 . Then By the lemma above, correspondence theory for a Sahlqvist implication in which the only propositional variable is p 0 reduces to that for a Sahlqvist implication with normative antecedents. More concretely, the case for such an implication χ reduces to that for the formula one obtains by replacing in χ the positive occurrences of p 0 in the antecedent by distinct propositional variables and, simultaneously, the other occurrences of p 0 by the disjunction of those distinct variables. We can further show a similar lemma for multiple variables to reduce the case for general Sahlqvist implications to that for Sahlqvist implications with normative antecedents.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. As in the correspondence theory for the standard Kripke semantics, one can show that the set of modal formulae that locally correspond to first-order formulae are closed under these operations:
(if no propositional variables occur in both χ and χ )
Also by the observation above one only needs to prove the theorem for a Sahlqvist implication whose antecedent is normative. This follows from Corollary 3.11.
For a better understanding of the methods of this section, let us apply them to a concrete example. Example 3.13. Assume that I is a singleton, denote its only element by * , and let R = R * and x y ↔ R y x. The B axiom from Example 2.4 has an equivalent form
which is a Sahlqvist implication. We will calculate a local correspondent of B op as an example, by using the theorems in this section.
As we saw in Example 2.4, we can assume extra conditions on the interaction of R and to make correspondents simpler, without loss of generality. In fact, something additional is true here: often, for an interaction condition C, if a first-order formula α(x) is a local correspondent of a modal formula φ over the possibility frames that satisfy C, i.e., for any possibility frame F |= C and w ∈ F,
then one can effectively obtain a first-orderα(x) which is a local correspondent of φ. See [19, Section 6.3] for the details. To compute a local correspondent of B op it is convenient to assume the following conditions, alongside (R-down):
Again, we can assume these conditions without loss of generality, in the strong sense stated above. One of the major consequences of the extra conditions is
We are now ready to calculate a local correspondent of B op . Using the simplified forcing relation (4) for ◊, we see that ST x (B op ) is equivalent to
Since p 0 follows exactly one in the antecedent of B op , one can apply Lemma 3.9 where the range of ∀P 0 is restricted to V * 1 . This class is defined by the first-order formula β * 1 (x; z), where β * 1 (x; z) ↔ Rz x by (23) . A local correspondent of B op is then obtained by applying Lemma 3.2: α B op (x)∧ α (x) is a local correspondent of B op , where α B op (x) is the first-order formula obtained by replacing
can be calculated to be
and α (x) is
One can check that, under the assumption of the extra conditions above, ∀x (α B op (x) ∧ α (x)) is equivalent to (3), the global correspondent of the B axiom given in Example 2.4.
Given that the analogue of the Sahlqvist Correspondence Theorem holds for possibility semantics, it is natural to ask whether an analogue of the Sahlqvist Completeness Theorem holds for possibility semantics as well. We will briefly discuss this question in Section 5.
MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we examine model-theoretic aspects of correspondence theory for possibility frames, extending and adapting the classical work of van Benthem [2] . We will see that the standard results for Kripke semantics smoothly extend to the setting of possibility semantics.
First, we investigate a model-theoretic characterization of modal formulae that globally correspond to first-order formulae. Unlike in the previous sections, we now regard possibility frames as (ordinary) structures for 2 (τ), i.e., with no restriction on the range of second-order variables. In this section, we use the term "structures" without qualifications to refer to this kind of structure for 2 (τ). We also assume in this section that I, the set of modal indices, is finite.
Let FR(φ) denote the set of possibility frames F such that for every possibility model M = (F, π) and every w ∈ F, we have M, w φ. Equivalently, FR(φ) is the set Mod(SOT(φ)) of structures that models the monadic second-order formula SOT(φ), where:
• β po states is a partial order; •Ũ 2 (χ) denotes the universal quantification by the second-order monadic variables occurring in χ, but with the domain of the quantification restricted to RO(F); concretely,Ũ 2 (χ) := χ for χ ∈ 2 (τ) with no monadic second-order free variables andŨ 2 (χ) :=Ũ 2 (∀P (β P val → χ)) for χ with a monadic secondorder free variable P; and • β P val is a sentence in 1 (τ ∪ {P}) that says that P is a regular open set within a possibility frame; i.e., β P val :≡ ∀x (P x ↔ β P ro (x)). Definition 4.1. Let F be a structure. A generated substructure G of F is a substructure of F such that if x ∈ G and F |= ♥x y for some ♥ ∈ { } ∪ {R a | a ∈ I}, then y ∈ G.
It can be shown that a generated substructure of a possibility frame as a structure is again a possibility frame (see [19, Proposition 5.50 
.2]).
Lemma 4.2. Let F be a structure and G be a generated substructure of F. Let π be an interpretation of P i (i ∈ κ). Then for each modal formula φ and each w ∈ G, we have
Proof. Obvious.
The following result is originally due to Goldblatt [14] . For a family (N i ) i∈J of structures and an ultrafilter U over J, we write i∈J N i /U for the ultraproduct of the family using J (see, e.g., [22] ). Lemma 4.3. Let (F i ) i∈J and (G i ) i∈J be families of structures. Assume that each F i is a generated substructure of G i . Let U be an ultrafilter over J. Then F := i F i /U is a generated substructure of G :
Proof. This can be proved in the same way as over Kripke frames whose accessibility relations are ♥'s as in Definition 4.1.
Recall that an ultrapower F J /U is the ultraproduct i∈J F i /U of the family (F i ) i∈J where F i = F for all i ∈ J. Given a family (F i ) i∈J of structures, one can think of a new structure i∈J F i , their disjoint union, since the signature τ is relational. Note that, if (F i ) i∈J is a family of possibility frames, then i∈J F i is again a possibility frame (see [19, Proposition 5.54 
Corollary 4.4. Let (F i ) i∈J be a family of structures and F := i∈J F i . Let U be an ultrafilter over J and G = i F i /U. Then G is isomorphic to some generated substructure of the ultrapower F J /U. Let us now turn to local correspondence. An analogous result for Kripke semantics was also proved by van Benthem [2] . Theorem 4.8. For φ ∈ (Φ, I), we have that φ locally corresponds to a first-order formula if and only if for every possibility frame F, every index set J and an ultrafilter U over J, we have
Proof. First observe that a modal formula φ locally corresponds to a first-order α(x) if and only if Mod([c/x] SOT(φ)) = Mod(α(c)) where Mod is defined analogously for the language 2 (τ ∪ {c}), and c is a new constant symbol. In addition, the quantifier-wise syntactic complexity of the sentence [c/x] SOT(φ) remains Π 1 1 in the new language. Thus, a proof similar to the one above applies to this theorem.
To be more precise, one can show the following analogue of Corollary 4.4:
Claim. Let ((F i , w i )) i∈J be a family of structures for 1 (τ ∪ {c}) and U be an ultrafilter over J. Then i F i /U can be embedded in the ultraproduct
and its image is a generated substructure of ( j∈J F j ) J /U.
is closed under ultraproducts of the form ( * ) if and only if φ locally corresponds to a first-order formula. This can easily seen to be equivalent to the condition ( †).
A standard application of a result like Theorem 4.8 is to obtain a syntactic closure property of the set of formulae having first-order correspondents, as follows. Proof. For simplicity, we omit modal operator indices. Suppose that φ does not locally correspond to a first-order formula. Then by Theorem 4.8, there exist a structure F = (W, R, ), an index set J, an ultrafilter U over J, and (w i ) i ∈ F J such that for every i ∈ I we have F |= SOT(φ)(w i ) but ((v) i /U). However, by construction, for every i ∈ J we have F i |= SOT( φ) (v) . Therefore, by Theorem 4.8, we know that φ does not locally correspond to a first-order formula.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that despite the richer structure of possibility frames, involving not only the accessibility relation but also the refinement relation, central results of standard correspondence theory continue to hold in this more general setting. A natural question raised by our results is this: does every formula that has a first-order correspondent in the setting of Kripke semantics also have a first-order correspondent in the setting of possibility semantics?
A second open problem suggested by our results concerns the Sahlqvist Completeness Theorem, which states that every Sahlqvist formula is canonical. A natural question to ask here is how this theorem can be extended to our general setting of possibility semantics. In [18, Section 5.6], a possibility-theoretic view of canonical extensions of BAOs is developed, according to which, for a normal modal logic Λ, there is a canonical possibility frame 10 whose modal theory is included in Λ. Unlike a canonical Kripke frame, built from the ultrafilters in the Lindenbaum algebra of a logic, a canonical possibility frame is built from proper filters in the Lindenbaum algebra. The possibility frame constructed from a BAO in this way is called a filter frame. Even for an uncountable modal language, the construction of the latter does not require the ultrafilter axiom, or equivalently, the Boolean prime ideal axiom. The possibility-semantic version of canonicity of a modal formula φ is then defined so that φ is filter-canonical if and only if, for every normal modal logic Λ containing φ, the logic's canonical possibility frame validates φ. Assuming the ultrafilter axiom, φ is filter-canonical if and only if φ is canonical in the standard Kripke-semantic sense [18, p. 122] . He also proves [18] , without use of the Boolean prime ideal axiom, that the underlying BAO of the filter possibility frame of a BAO A coincides with what Gehrke and Harding [13] [10] are that every inductive formula is filter-canonical, and that every normal modal logic axiomatized by inductive formulae is sound and complete with respect to its canonical possibility frame.
Another question raised by our results concerns the potential applicability to possibility semantics of ALBA [8] , a group of general syntactic algorithms that can calculate correspondents of formulae in many non-classical logics that are interpreted in lattices with operators. A possible research direction is to adapt the techniques of ALBA in order to reformulate the argument in Section 3 as a variant of ALBA and to prove more general correspondence results for possibility semantics.
